Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures

Abstract : A candidate is said to be socially acceptable if the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half (Mahajne and Volij, 2018). For every voting profile, there always exists at least one socially acceptable candidate. This candidate may not be elected by some well-known voting rules, which may even lead in some cases to the election of a socially unacceptable candidate, the latter being a candidate such that the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is strictly less than the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half. In this paper, our contribution is twofold. First, since the existence of a socially unacceptable candidate is not always guaranteed, we determine the probabilities of the existence of such a candidate. Then, we evaluate how often the Plurality rule, the Negative Plurality rule, the Borda rule and their two-round versions can elect a socially unacceptable candidate. We perform our calculations under both the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture,
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadata

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03614587
Contributor : Eric Kamwa Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Sunday, March 20, 2022 - 10:37:28 PM
Last modification on : Friday, March 25, 2022 - 3:57:47 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, June 21, 2022 - 6:36:37 PM

File

Awde_et_al_05_03_2022.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03614587, version 1

Citation

Ahmad Awde, Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Julien yves Rolland, Abdelmonaim Tlidi. Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures. 2022. ⟨hal-03614587⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

28

Files downloads

10